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Coalition Formation and the 
Ancillary Benefits of Climate Policy  
 
Abstract 
Several studies found ancillary benefits of environmental policy to be of considerable 
size. These additional private benefits imply not only higher cooperative but also non-
cooperative abatement targets. However, beyond these largely undisputed important 
quantitative effects, there are qualitative and strategic implications associated with 
ancillary benefits: climate policy is no longer a pure but an impure public good. In 
this paper, we investigate these implications in a setting of non-cooperative coalition 
formation. In particular, we address the following questions. 1) Do ancillary benefits 
increase participation in international environmental agreements? 2) Do ancillary 
benefits raise the success of these treaties in welfare terms? 
Keywords: ancillary benefits, climate policy, coalition formation, game theory, 
impure public goods    
JEL classifications: C72, H87, Q54 
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1. Introduction  
International negotiations on climate change are now in the process of intensive 
search for a post-Kyoto protocol. The current situation is quite different from the 
1990s when the Kyoto Protocol had been agreed upon by most industrialized 
countries. One important change is that China has meanwhile out-dated the US as the 
largest emitter of greenhouse gases (GHGs). Also the growing emissions of develop-
ing countries necessitate the inclusion of these countries in a post-Kyoto protocol if 
such an agreement shall be effective. 
In particular developing countries have a vivid interest in combating global warming 
because it is especially their economies that will be negatively affected by climate 
change. Furthermore, there were significant extra benefits additional to slowing global 
warming which these countries could obtain if they actively contributed to climate 
protection. In this respect Aunan et al. (2007: 472) argue that a climate protection 
commitment would provide significant ancillary benefits to China1 since climate 
protection efforts will not only cause a reduction in GHG emissions but also reduc-
tions in particles- and NOX-emissions. These (and other) non-GHG-emission reduc-
tions – in turn – will improve public health and will increase agricultural yields. Smith 
and Haigler (2008) recently offered sample calculations which illustrate the high-
degree of ancillary benefit effectiveness for interventions in the household energy 
sector in developing countries. Further studies on ancillary benefits in the developing 
world are provided by, e.g. van Vuuren et al. (2003), Vennemo et al. (2006) for 
                                                 
1  Ancillary benefits are benefits generated by climate policy, but are not derived from the 
slowing of climate change. Other terms which convey this idea are secondary benefits, co-
benefits and spillover benefits (see IPCC (2001)). The main difference between the terms 
is the relative emphasis given to benefits derived from slowing climate change versus 
other benefits. The types of impacts being covered are the same under each of these labels 
(Markandya and Rübbelke (2004: 489)).   
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China, Dessus and O’Connor (2003) for Chile and Bussolo and O’Connor (2001) for 
India. 
Although considered to be of less importance than in developing countries, ancillary 
benefits in industrialized countries may also be significant. Several studies found that 
ancillary benefits may even represent a multiple of primary benefits, i.e. the benefits 
derived from the slowing of climate change,2 as Pearce (2000: 523) illustrates in an 
overview. The compilation of ancillary benefit assessments for the US provided by 
Pearce (2000: 523) shows that ancillary benefits are a multiple of primary benefits, in 
the range between 0.07 and 6.67 (for European studies the range is between 0.98 
(UK) and 6.93 (Germany)). An overview of further US studies is provided by Burtraw 
et al. (2003: 650-673). 
As Ekins (1996a: 163, 1996b: 14) illustrates the inclusion of ancillary benefits in cost-
benefit analyses will cause a rise in optimal climate policy levels. Beyond the quanti-
tative effect of ancillary benefits, there is also a qualitative dimension. Whereas the 
primary benefits of climate policy can be enjoyed globally, the ancillary benefits can 
only be enjoyed on a local or regional scale (IPCC (1996: 217)).3 In other words, 
climate protection generated by climate policy is a global public good, while the 
ancillary effects are mainly a private good from the climate policy providing coun-
try’s or region’s point of view. 
                                                 
2  Rübbelke (2002: 5-23) provides an extensive distinction between primary and ancillary 
benefits. 
3   Furthermore, in contrast to primary benefit, ancillary benefits arise almost immediately 
after the climate protection measure has been accomplished. Krupnick, Burtraw and 
Markandya (2000: 55) note: “we feel the heart of the analysis of ancillary benefits 
involves the here and now that is relevant to individual policy makers in a national 
context.” 
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Already Musgrave (1959: 13) stressed: “Certain public wants may fall on the border 
line between private and social wants, where the exclusion principle can be applied to 
part of the benefits gained but not to all.” Because of the joint-production property of 
climate policy and the fact that the jointly generated outputs are partly private to indi-
vidual countries or regions and partly public to the whole world, climate policy is a 
so-called impure public good (see Cornes and Sandler (1996: 542)). It is important to 
note that the join-production property which we consider, i.e. implying that one 
strategy has two effects (a private and a public), differs from the analyses of mitiga-
tion versus adaptation (e.g. Barrett (2008)) or joint supply of climate mitigation and 
R&D on new abatement technologies (e.g. Barrett (2006)), implying two strategies 
and two effects. 
In recent years, the impure public good case also raised much attention in the 
theoretical oriented literature. Andreoni (1989, 1998) applies the basic approach 
developed by Cornes and Sandler (1984) to the field of philanthropy. Cornes and 
Sandler (1994) demonstrate that substitutability and complementarity of the private and 
public good lead to quite different comparative static results. Comparative static 
analyses based on the model by Cornes and Sandler (1994) are also conducted by 
Rübbelke (2003) who investigates climate policy as well as by Kotchen (2005) who 
considers environmentally friendly consumption. Rübbelke (2003) includes an alter-
native technology producing the impure public good’s private characteristic inde-
pendently of the public characteristic, while Kotchen (2005) allows for both, an inde-
pendent production of the private as well as of the public characteristic.  
In his analysis of green markets Kotchen (2006) also considers alternative technolo-
gies producing the impure public good’s characteristics. He finds the surprising 
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result that green technologies can be either welfare-improving or immiserizing, 
although they expand the consumer’s choice possibilities and augment the produc-
tion options. Kotchen and Moore (2007) employ the impure public good approach to 
the analysis of household participation in green-electricity programs. Dubin and 
Navarro (1988) address household refuse collection in an impure public good setting 
and Khanna, Huffman and Sandler (1994) analyze agricultural research. 
Sandler and Murdoch (1990) provide an interesting study with a system of demand 
equations for pure and impure public good problems, distinguishing between Nash-
Cournot and Lindahl behaviour. They illustrate their technique with estimating 
military expenditure equations for a sample of ten NATO allies. They find that Nash-
Cournot, rather than Lindahl behaviour, best characterizes allies’ behaviour. More 
importantly, they find that the impure public good specification provides a better fit 
than the pure public good specification of their model.  
The impure public good property has not only distributional consequences, i.e. 
concerning who is enjoying the benefits, but has also consequences for the good’s 
production prospects. “This follows because the jointly produced private output can 
serve a privatising role, not unlike the establishment of property rights” (Cornes and 
Sandler (1984: 595)). Nevertheless, impure public good provision tends to be subop-
timal low because of the good’s public characteristic (and despite its jointly generated 
private characteristic) and the associated free-rider incentives. 
More specifically: on the one hand, ancillary benefits will call for higher globally 
optimal abatement levels. On the other hand, this will also be the case in the non-
cooperative equilibrium. For individual countries it is no longer irrelevant where the 
climate policy is accomplished. If a country does not contribute to climate protection, 
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it will not enjoy ancillary benefits, though it can still benefit from the global benefits. 
Due to the impure public good nature of climate policy, international coordination is 
still needed. However, there is no global coercive authority which can enforce effi-
cient global climate protection and consequently, countries have to voluntarily negoti-
ate and agree upon such coordination. 
It is therefore important to ascertain not only the largely undisputed quantitative and 
qualitative impacts of ancillary benefits for climate policy levels, but also their strate-
gic implications. Recently, by using normal form games, Pittel and Rübbelke (2008) 
investigated the outcome of international negotiations on climate change in two 
different scenarios: one with and one without the inclusion of ancillary benefits. They 
find that if international negotiations are represented as a chicken game, ancillary 
benefits tend to have a positive influence on the propensity of countries to participate 
in an international agreement on climate change.  
In this paper, we will investigate this idea further. We depart from the simple bi-
matrix games used in Pittel and Rübbelke (2008) and analyze the effects of ancillary 
benefits in the strategic setting of non-cooperative coalition formation. We consider 
three model versions, which have been considered in the literature. We reach quite 
different and mostly negative conclusions. The driving forces are different in the three 
models. In the first model, ancillary benefits lead to smaller coalition as they reduce 
the threshold of countries necessary for an agreement to be profitable. In the other two 
models, ancillary benefits increase not only abatement and payoffs of coalition 
members but also of outsiders, which leaves the free-rider incentives mainly 
unchanged. 
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In the following, we develop our framework, analyze the size of stable coalitions and 
evaluate the success of coalition formation in welfare terms for three models in 
section 2. Finally, we summarize our main findings in section 3 and point to possible 
future research issues. 
2. The Model 
2.1 Introduction 
We consider the two-stage cartel formation game with N  countries – which can be 
regarded as the working horse in the analysis of international environmental agree-
ments since Barrett (1994), Carraro and Siniscalco (1993) and Hoel (1992).4 In the 
first stage, countries decide upon membership. Countries that join the coalition are 
called signatories (with superscript M  for member) and those that remain outside are 
called non-signatories (with superscript NM  for non-members) and assumed to act as 
singletons. Let n N≤  denote the number of signatories with N  the total number of 
countries. In the second stage, signatories coordinate their action and choose their 
abatement by maximizing the aggregate payoff to all signatories. Non-signatories 
maximize their own payoff as singletons. The payoff function of an individual 
country is given by 
(1) ( )Ni j i
j 1
B q C qπ
=
⎛ ⎞= −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑  
where benefits, B( X ) , depend on total abatement, 
N
j
j 1
q
=
∑ , and C( x )  on individual 
abatement, iq . We assume countries to be ex-ante symmetric, i.e. all have the same 
payoff function, but depending on whether they are signatories or non-signatories they 
                                                 
4  A survey is provided in Finus (2003, 2008). 
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may receive different payoffs ex-post.5 Given the equilibrium abatement choices in 
the second stage, a signatory’s payoff is denoted by Mi ( n )π  and a non-signatory 
payoff by NMi ( n )π  in order to indicate that payoffs will depend on the number of 
signatories. Working back to the first stage, a coalition is said to be stable if it is 
internally and externally stable: 
(2) Internal Stability: M NMi i( n ) ( n 1)π π≥ −  i S∀ ∈  
(3) External Stability:  NM Mi i( n ) ( n 1)π π> +  i S∀ ∉  
denoting S  the set of coalition members and where we assume for convenience that 
in case a non-signatory is indifferent between joining and staying outside the coalition 
he will join. In some parts of the analysis it will be helpful to work with the stability 
function introduced by Hoel and Schneider (1997) M NMi i i( n ) ( n ) ( n 1)Φ π π= − −  
noticing that i ( n ) 0Φ ≥  means internal stability and i ( n 1) 0Φ + <  external stability. 
In other words, if coalition n  is internally stable, then coalition n 1−  is externally un-
stable and if coalition n  is externally stable, then coalition n 1+  is internally unstable.  
In case we consider ancillary benefits, payoff function (1) becomes: 
(4) ( )Ni j i i
j 1
B q B( q ) C qπ α
=
⎛ ⎞= + −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑  with 0α ≥  . 
Thus, the parameter α  measures the weight which ancillary benefits receive in the 
payoff function of countries. These additional benefits only depend on the abatement 
conducted in this country. For simplicity, we assume the same functional form for 
                                                 
5  This assumption has been made frequently in the literature though it is certainly a 
simplification. See for instance Diamantoudi and Sartzetakis (2006) and Rubio and Ulph 
(2006). 
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benefits from global abatement and ancillary benefits. The coalition game is solved in 
exactly the same way. However, payoffs will depend on α  and hence we write  
M
i ( n, )π α  and NMi ( n, )π α , respectively. Also stability is defined in the same way, 
accounting for the different notation, e.g. M NMi i i( n, ) ( n, ) ( n 1, )Φ α π α π α= − −  etc. 
Subsequently, we consider specific benefit and cost functions that have been 
frequently used in the literature as analytical results for general payoff functions 
cannot be derived. 
2.2 Model with Linear Benefit and Cost Functions 
2.2.1 No Ancillary Benefits 
The simplest payoff function assumes linear benefit and cost functions, which may 
almost be regarded as a toy model, though it has gained a lot of popularity in the 
recent literature (e.g. Barrett (2003), Ulph (2004) and Kolstad (2007)). The reason – 
apart from its simplicity – is that this model version allows generating every stable 
coalition size which can be related to the benefit-cost ratio from abatement.  
Consider the following payoff function where b  is a benefit and c  a cost parameter: 
(5) 
N
i j i
j 1
b q cqπ
=
= −∑  with b 0>  and c 0>  . 
Since only the relation b / c  matters, we let b / cγ =  and rewrite (5): 
(5)# 
N
i j i
j 1
q qπ γ
=
= −∑  with 0γ >  . 
In this simple model, players face only a binary choice: abate or not abate which we 
can normalize to iq 0=  and iq 1= . In order to make this model interesting for the 
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subsequent analysis, we follow the standard assumption in the literature and assume 
that in the social optimum, abatement iq 1=  is an equilibrium choice, i.e. 
(6) Ass. 1: N 1 0γ − >  
and that in the Nash equilibrium no abatement iq 0=  is an equilibrium choice 
(7) Ass. 2: 1 0γ − <  . 
That is abatement pays from a global but not from an individual perspective. Summa-
rizing, this prisoners’ type of incentive structure requires the following range of 
parameters: 
(8) Ass. 1+2: 1 1 / Nγ> >  . 
Total payoffs in the social optimum are S N( N 1)Π γ= −  and in the Nash equilibrium 
simply N 0Π = . If a coalition of n  countries forms, and if these signatories abate, 
they receive a payoff of Mi ( n ) n 1π γ= −  as for all N n−  non-signatories no abate-
ment is a dominant strategy.  
Suppose now one player leaves the coalition with n  signatories such that n 1−  
signatories are left. Consider first the possibility that signatories continue to abate 
(though the free-rider will no abate as this is the equilibrium choice as a singleton). 
Then the free-rider would receive a payoff of NMi ( n 1) ( n 1)π γ− = − . Internal stability 
would require that M NMi i( n ) n 1 ( n 1) ( n 1)π γ γ π= − ≥ − = −  or 1γ >  which we ruled 
out by assumption 2 in (7). Consider now the second possibility that signatories 
switch from abatement to no abatement once a signatory leaves and hence 
NM
i ( n 1) 0π − = . Let *n n= , then internal stability requires 
 10
(9) M * NM *i i( n ) n 1 0 ( n 1)π γ π= − ≥ = −  and M * *i ( n 1) ( n 1) 1 0π γ− = − − <  . 
In other words, *n  is the largest integer of the relation 1 / γ , i.e. *n I(1 / )γ= . For 
any *n n> , signatories would continue to abate after one signatory has left their coali-
tion, which cannot be an equilibrium as argued above. For any *n n<  signatories 
would not abate in the first place (as abatement is not profitable) and hence no coali-
tion would form. It is easily checked that *n  is also the only coalition which is exter-
nally stable and hence stable. Thus, in this model there is a strong threshold effect. 
The lower the benefit-cost ratio γ , the larger will be the threshold effect and hence 
*n .  
Total payoff in the coalition equilibrium is given by 
C * M * * NM *
i in ( n ) ( N n ) ( n )Π π π= + −  and hence C *n ( N 1)Π γ= −  in this model. For 
comparison later, we measure the performance of this equilibrium in relative terms, 
which we call “closing the gap index “(Eyckmans and Finus (2006)) and define as 
follows: 
(10) 
C N
S NCGI :
Π Π
Π Π
−= −  
with 1 CGI 0≥ ≥ . For the model above, we find: 
(11) 
*nCGI
N
=  . 
Thus, anything else being equal, the closing the gap index decreases with the number 
of players involved in the externality problem – a result reflecting the public good 
nature of the global environmental problem and well-known from other models. 
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2.2.2 Ancillary Benefits 
Consider now ancillary benefits in this model. Since again only the relation b / cγ =  
matters, the payoff function reads now: 
(12) 
N
i j i i
j 1
( ) q q qπ α γ αγ
=
= + −∑  with 0γ >  and 0α ≥  . 
Like in the previous version, we have to impose some parameter restrictions in order 
to have an interesting incentive structure. Abatement is globally rational provided 
(13) Ass. 3: N 1 0γ αγ+ − >   
holds which gives us the lower bound of γ , i.e. 1 /( N )γ α> + . Abatement is not 
individually rational provided  
(14) Ass. 4: 1 0γ αγ+ − <  
holds which gives us the upper bound of γ , i.e. 1 /(1 )γ α< +  and hence together we 
get: 
(15) Ass. 3+4: 1 /(1 ) 1 /( N )α γ α+ > > +  . 
Hence, compared to (8), the parameter range has to be smaller to preserve the prison-
ers’ dilemma incentive structure. Note that if (14) does not hold, i.e. ancillary benefits 
would be very large, then all players would abate and Nash equilibrium and social 
optimum coincide. Consequently, there is no need for forming a coalition and there-
fore we disregard this possibility subsequently. Taken together, the global payoff in 
the social optimum is given by S ( ) N( N 1)Π α γ αγ= + −  and in the Nash equilib-
rium by N ( ) 0Π α = . 
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Following exactly the same arguments presented above, it turns out that the equilib-
rium coalition *n ( )α  is the coalition for which (see (9) above) 
(16) M * * N *i i( n , ) n ( ) 1 0 ( n 1, )π α α γ αγ π α= + − ≥ = −  and 
M * *
i ( n 1, ) ( n ( ) 1) 1 0π α α γ αγ− = − + − <  
holds and hence *n ( ) I((1 / ) )α γ α= − . Since * *n ( ) I((1 / ) ) I(1 / ) nα γ α γ= − ≤ = , 
ancillary benefits will lead to the same or a smaller coalition than without ancillary 
benefits. In particular, the larger ancillary benefits are, measured by the parameter α , 
the smaller will be the equilibrium coalition. The reason is that ancillary benefits 
reduce the threshold number of signatories for which it pays the coalition members to 
abate and hence to form a coalition at all.  
Certainly the size of a coalition is one indicator of success. However, the global 
payoff is what counts. The global coalition payoff is given by 
( )C *( ) n ( ) N 1Π α α γ αγ= + − . Since payoff functions without and with ancillary 
benefits are different, we again measure the success of the coalition equilibrium in 
relative terms (see (10) above) and find: 
(17) 
*n ( )CGI( )
N
αα =  . 
Since * *n n ( )α≥ , and comparing (11) with (17), it is obvious that ancillary benefits 
cannot improve, but can only worsen the situation. As we will see, this negative 
conclusion will not change much in the subsequent models. 
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2.3 Model with Linear Benefit and Quadratic Cost Functions 
2.3.1 No Ancillary Benefits 
Consider the following payoff function which has been considered for instance in 
Botteon and Carraro (1997), Barrett (2006) and Finus and Maus (2008): 
(18) 
N
2
i j i
j 1
cb q q
2
π
=
= −∑  with b 0>  and c 0>  . 
Also for this model only the relation b / c  matters, and hence we let b / cγ =  and 
rewrite (18): 
(18)# 
N
2
i j i
j 1
1q q
2
π γ
=
= −∑  with 0γ >  . 
The first order conditions of signatories read Min q 0γ − =  and for non-signatories 
NM
iq 0γ − = , assuming an interior solution and denoting abatement of signatories with 
superscript M  (members) and abatement of non-signatories with superscript NM  
(non-members). Hence, Miq ( n ) nγ=  and NMiq γ=  and total abatement is given 
C 2Q ( n ) n ( N n )γ γ= + − . If one coalition member leaves, Miq ( n 1) ( n 1)γ− = − , 
NM
iq γ=  and C 2Q ( n 1) ( n 1) ( N n 1)γ γ− = − + − + . Substitution into the payoff 
function gives 
(19) M 2 2i
1( n ) ( n 4N 1 2n )
2
π γ= + + − , NM 2 2i ( n ) ( n 2N n )π γ= + − ,  
NM 2 2
i ( n 1) (( n 1) 2N ( n 1))π γ− = − + − −  
Computation of the stability function M NMi i i( n ) ( n ) ( n 1)Φ π π= − −  shows that 
i ( n ) 0Φ ≥  for n { 2,3 }∈  and i ( n 1) 0Φ + <  for n 3≥  and hence *n 3= . We can now 
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compute the global payoff in the coalition equilibrium by using *n 3= : 
C * M * * NM
i in ( n ) ( N n ) ( n )Π π π= + − . Moreover, the global payoff in the social opti-
mum is simply N  times Mi ( n )π  by substituting N  for n  in Mi ( n )π . Similarly, the 
global payoff in the Nash equilibrium is simply N  times NMi ( n )π  by setting n 1=  in 
NM
i ( n )π . We find for the closing the gap index: 
(20) 2
12( N 2 )CGI
N( N 1)
−= −  
which is positive but smaller than 1  if N 3>  because then the grand coalition is not 
stable ( *n N< ). Again, it straightforward to show that CGI / N 0∂ ∂ <  provided 
N 3> . Hence, as in the first model (section 2.2), the coalition improves upon the non-
cooperative outcome but achieves only little if the number of countries is large which 
suffer from the externality. 
2.3.2 Ancillary Benefits 
Modifying payoff function (18)# to account for ancillary benefits gives: 
(21) 
N
2
i j i i
j 1
1q q q
2
π γ αγ
=
= + −∑  with 0γ >  and 0α ≥  . 
Now, Miq ( n, ) ( n )α γ α= +  and NMiq ( ) (1 )α γ α= + . Hence, signatories and non-
signatories adjust their abatement levels upward. This is also the case in the social 
optimum and the Nash equilibrium with Siq ( ) ( N )α γ α= +  and Niq ( ) (1 )α γ α= + , 
respectively. Again, we can compute Mi ( n, )π α , MNi ( n, )π α  and MNi ( n 1, )π α−  now 
accounting for ancillary benefits. The stability check delivers the same coalition size, 
*n ( ) 3α =  and the closing the gap index is exactly (20). Roughly speaking, all rela-
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tions just change by the factor α . The drop in benefits (benefits from global abate-
ment and ancillary benefits) and the drop in abatement costs when leaving a coalition 
become larger, but by the same factor. Hence, stability is not affected. The same 
applies when computing relative performance. Consequently, compared to the previ-
ous model, ancillary benefits have at least not a negative effect, but the conclusion is 
also not brighter. 
2.4 Model with Quadratic Benefit and Quadratic Cost Functions 
Consider the following payoff function: 
(22) 
N N
2 2 2
i j j i i i
j 1 j 1
1 1 cb( a q q ) b( aq q ) q
2 2 2
π α
= =
= − + − −∑ ∑  with b 0> , c 0>  and 
0α ≥  . 
This payoff function is essentially the same as in Barrett (1994), Diamantoudi and 
Sartzetakis (2006) and Rubio and Ulph (2006), though they assume 0α = .6 In order 
to save space, we derive in this section the case without and with ancillary benefits 
together, noticing from the previous analysis that no ancillary benefits is a special 
case of ancillary benefits when setting 0.α =  Since this model is far more messy in 
terms of derivations than the previous models, we sketch here only the main argu-
ments of the analysis and relegate the details to the appendix. 
The first thing to notice is that – inserting equilibrium abatement levels into the 
marginal benefit function from global abatement, marginal benefits could become 
negative. This is equivalent to saying that total abatement in the social optimum could 
                                                 
6  Diamantoudi and Sartzetakis (2006) and Rubio and Ulph (2006) specify their model in 
terms of emissions but the incentive structure remains the same as long as non-negativity 
constraints are observed (which we do) as this authors prove. However, different from 
these authors we do not assume Stackelberg leadership of signatories to be consistent with 
the previous models where Stackelberg leadership would make no difference due to 
dominant strategies. See Finus (2003). 
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be smaller than in the Nash equilibrium if the weight α  which ancillary benefits 
receive is sufficiently large. In the appendix we show that a sufficient condition to 
rule this out and to ensure reasonable results, is: 
(23) Ass. 5: 1
( N 1)
αγ ≥−  with b / cγ =  . 
In a next step we analyze the stability function, which we write 
M NM
i i i( n, ) ( n, ) ( n 1, )Φ Γ π Γ π Γ= − −  with Γ  a set of parameters, comprising α , 
b / cγ =  and N . It turns out that stability does not depend on the parameter a . Not 
surprising for N 2= , i ( 2, ) 0Φ Γ > , i.e. the grand coalition is stable. In order to 
analyze the more interesting case of N 3≥ , we first show that i ( n, ) / N 0Φ Γ∂ ∂ <  
(and 2 2i( n, ) / N 0Φ Γ∂ ∂ < ). That is, with an increasing number of coalition members, 
it becomes more difficult to establish stability for a given number of signatories, n . 
Hence, in order to test whether i ( n, )Φ Γ  can be positive for n 2> , we substitute 
N 3=  and n 3=  into the stability function and find i ( 3, ) 0Φ Γ < . Hence, we can 
conclude that there cannot be a stable coalition larger than 2. This finding is well 
known and probably goes back to Carraro and Siniscalco (1991). The new and inter-
esting part is that this also holds for ancillary benefits for any α  defined in the range 
in (23).  
In a next step, we set 0α =  and n 2=  in the stability function but make no further 
assumptions, i.e. i ( n 2, 0, ,N )Φ α γ= = . We establish that for 0 ( N ) 1γ γ≤ ≤ ≤  
i ( n 2, 0, ,N ) 0Φ α γ= = ≥  is positive where ( N )γ  is an upper bound which decreases 
in N , ( N ) / N 0γ∂ ∂ < . That is, with an increasing number of players N , the range 
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of the parameter γ  for which internal stability can be guaranteed for two signatories 
decreases.  
Now we let 0α ≥  in the stability function, i ( n 2, , ,N )Φ α γ= , and show that 
i ( n 2, , ,N ) 0Φ α γ= ≥  if ( ,N )α Ψ γ> . Since α  is bounded from above as spelled out 
in (23), we get: 
(24) 1 ( ,N )
( N 1)
α Ψ γγ ≥ ≥−  with b / cγ =  
such that ancillary benefits can make a difference. For ( N )γ γ=  it can be shown that 
there exists an α  satisfying this inequality. However, the upper bound of α  in (24), 
1 /(( N 1) )γ− , decreases in γ  and N  and the lower bound of α , ( ,N )Ψ γ , increases 
in γ  and N . Thus, for a given N , we can only slightly increase γ  above ( N )γ  such 
that α  can still satisfy condition (24). With increasing N  this possibility diminishes 
further.  
For instance, denoting the upper bound of γ  with ancillary benefits by ( N , )γ α , 
( N , ) ( N )γ α γ> , such that for 0 ( N , )γ γ α≤ ≤  i ( n 2, , ,N ) 0Φ α γ= ≥ , then we find 
for N 3= : ( N , ) 0.59γ α =  but only ( N ) 0.41γ =  without ancillary benefits. How-
ever, already for N 7= : ( N , ) 0.08γ α = , which is only slightly above ( N ) 0.07γ =  
without ancillary benefits. Thus, the possible extension of the parameter range of γ  
for which a coalition of two players is stable with ancillary benefits tends to zero for a 
sufficiently large number of players.  
Even more interesting is that one can show that for N 4≥ , the closing the gap index, 
CGI , as defined in (10), decreases in α  for 0 ( N ) 1γ γ≤ ≤ ≤ . This is the parameter 
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range for which a two player coalition would be stable even without ancillary 
benefits. Thus, it is only for ( N ) ( N , )γ γ γ α< ≤  where no coalition would be stable 
without ancillary benefits and hence CGI 0=  where ancillary benefits can make a 
difference (CGI 0> ). However, as pointed out above, with increasing N  the differ-
ence between ( N , )γ α  and ( N )γ  shrinks and is almost zero already for N 10= .  
Taken together for this model the effect of ancillary benefits is mixed, though also not 
very encouraging. First of all, ancillary benefits cannot expand the coalition to more 
than 2 signatories which is the upper limit without ancillary benefits. Second, for the 
parameter range of the benefit-cost parameter γ  for which a coalition of two signato-
ries is stable without ancillary benefits, an increasing weight α  of ancillary benefits 
has a negative impact on the relative performance measured as the closing the gap 
index. Third, in a few instances, ancillary benefits can expand the range of the 
benefit-cost parameter for which a two player coalition is stable. This expansion is 
negligible if the total number of players is sufficiently large.  
3. Summary and Conclusions 
Ancillary benefits have attracted much attention in climate change research and are 
regularly found to be of significant size. The IPCC (2007: 623) stresses the impor-
tance of ancillary benefits in the design of air pollution reduction and energy security 
policy and the rise in rural employment. The “efficiency-raising impact” of an inclu-
sion of ancillary benefits in cost-benefit analyses has been highlighted recurrently. 
Estimated efficient climate protection levels tend to rise considerably due to the inclu-
sion of ancillary benefits.  
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However, what was largely omitted in the scientific literature is the analysis of the 
strategic implications of the privatizing effect of ancillary benefits. Intuitively, one 
would expect that taking account of ancillary benefits will alleviate free-rider incen-
tives and hence will raise the attractiveness of participation in international agree-
ments to slow climate change.  
In our paper, we focused on the strategic implications of ancillary benefits. We 
analysed the impacts of ancillary benefits in the strategic setting of non-cooperative 
coalition formation. Our results were counter-intuitive – at least at first thought. We 
found that ancillary benefits have a neutral or negative impact on the size of stable 
coalitions the success of coalition formation measured in welfare terms. Only in the 
model with quadratic benefit and quadratic cost functions could ancillary benefits 
expand the range of the benefit-cost parameter for which a two player coalition can be 
stable, though this occurs only in a few instances. However even then the expansion 
was insignificant if the total number of players is sufficiently large.  
The conclusion which can be drawn from these results is that although ancillary 
benefits provide additional incentives to protect the climate, they will not raise the 
likelihood of an efficient global agreement on climate change to come about. 
The intuition behind this result is that countries taking the private ancillary benefits to 
a greater extent into account will provide more climate policy, irrespective of an 
international agreement. The relative importance of an international agreement for 
climate protection is reduced since the privatizing effect of ancillary benefits already 
provides incentives for protection in a non-cooperative setting. Hence, though 
ancillary benefits provide an additional incentive to participate and to raise abatement 
contributions, they also provide an additional incentive to leave the agreement.  
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As outlined in the introduction, countries are enjoying different levels of ancillary 
benefits. In developing countries these seem to be more important than in industrial-
ized countries. This heterogeneity should be included in future models. Furthermore, 
it should be taken into account that ancillary effects, like the mitigation of local air 
pollution, can also be produced by technologies (like desulphurisation installations) 
which do not produce climate protection. These technologies tend to reduce the level 
of ancillary benefits. Moreover, technological interdependencies should be explored 
in future research. Finally, there may also be ancillary cost, e.g. induced by a reduc-
tion in energy self-sufficiency, associated with certain climate policies. It would be 
interesting to see how these affect the outcome. 
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Appendix 
For payoff function (22) in the text the first order condition of a non-signatory and 
signatory, respectively, are given by  
(A1) ( ) MN MNNM M Q Qab b Q Q ab b c 0N M N Mα ⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞− + + − − =⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟− −⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠  
(A2) ( )( ) M MNM M Q Qn ab b Q Q ab b c 0n nα ⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞− + + − − =⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠  
where we denote total abatement of non-signatories by NMQ  and of signatories by 
MQ  with the understanding that total abatement is NM M NM Mi iQ Q ( N n )q nq+ = − + . 
Solving (A1) and (A2) simultaneously delivers: 
(A3) 
2 2
M
2
abn( nc bn N bn bN b ac )Q
( b c )( b bn bN bn c )
α α α α
α α
− + + + += + + + − +  
(A4) 
2 2
NM
2
ab( N n )( b b bn n b c c )Q
( b c )( b bn bN bn c )
α α α α α
α α
− + + − + += + + + − +  
Computing NM NMiq Q /( N n )= −  and M Miq Q / n=  we find 
(A5) M NMi i 2
ab( n 1)( c b( N 1))q q
( b c )( b bn bN bn c )
α
α α
− − −− = + + + − +  
which is only positive provided  
(A6) c b( N 1)α≥ −  ⇔  1 ( N 1)αγ≥ −  ⇔  1
( N 1)
αγ ≥−  with b / cγ = .  
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holds. It can be shown that condition (A6) is also sufficient that socially optimal 
abatement levels are weakly larger than those in the Nash equilibrium. Moreover, by 
substituting (A3) and (A4) into individual marginal benefits from global abatement, 
MN Nab b( Q Q )− + , it can also be shown that (A6) is a sufficient condition to ensure 
positive marginal benefits, i.e. MN Nab b( Q Q ) 0− + ≥ . 
Casual observation of NMQ  in (A4) reveals that NMQ 0≥  for any permissible assump-
tion of parameters. This is less evident for MQ  in (A3). First we notice that the 
denominator is always positive. The term in brackets in the numerator, taking note of 
b / c γ= , can be written as 2 2n ( N n nN )α α γ γα+ + + + − . Now 2( N n nN )+ −  can 
be negative. Hence, we investigate 2n ( N n nN )γα+ + −  because 2α α γ+  is anyway 
positive. We replace α  by its highest value given by (A6), namely 1 /(( N 1) )γ α− =  
in 2n ( N n nN )γα+ + − . Then, we get after some manipulation 2N n n 0+ − > . 
Hence, we have proved that also signatories’ abatement is always positive. 
In a next step we analyze the stability function M NMi i i( n ) ( n ) ( n 1)Φ π π= − − . We find 
(A7) 
2 2 2
M NM
i i i
( n 1)( bN 1 b ) ( b a ) D( n, ) ( n ) ( n 1)
E F G
α αΦ Γ π π − − −= − − = ii i  with  
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 2D ( 3 4b n 2bN 6bn 2b Nn 4b n N 3b n 2b n N 2b n b nα α α= − − − + − + − − − + + +  
3 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 5 2 3 2 4 22n b N b N 2nbN nb N 2bn b n 7b n 5b n 6 b 8bn 2n bα α+ + + + + + + − − − +  
2 2 2 2 2 2 28b n 3 b 2 b N 6 b n 4 b )α α α α α− − − + −  
2 2E 2( b bn 3bn 2b bN 1)α= + − + + + , 2 2F ( b bn bN bn 1)α= + + − + , G ( b 1)α= +  
where E , F  and G  are positive and hence the numerator is positive. The first three 
terms in the denominator are also positive. Hence, the sign of i ( n, )Φ Γ  depends on 
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the sign of D . We observe that D  does not depend on the parameter a  and only 
depends on the relation b / cγ = . Hence the sign of i ( n, )Φ Γ  and hence the sign of 
D  is a function of the parameters α , γ , N  and n . Dividing D  by 2c  and using 
b / cγ = , we find 
(A8) 3 2D / N 2( n N n Nn n 2 n 1) 0αγ γ γ αγ γ γ γ∂ ∂ = − + + − + − − − <  
because the term in brackets is positive, noticing that n 1≥ . Moreover,  
(A9) 2 2D / N 2 ( n ) 0γ γ γ∂ ∂ = − + <  
Substituting N 2=  and n 2=  into D  gives  
(A10) 2 2 2D( 2,2 ) 1 4 4 2 0γ αγ α γ αγ= + + + + >  
Substituting N 3=  and n 3=  into D  gives 
(A11) D( 3,3 ) 8 ( 9 1) 0γ γ αγ= − + + <  
and hence we can conclude that for N 3≥  there is no stable coalition of more than 2 
signatories. Hence, it remains to analyze stability for n 2=  and N 3≥ . 
Substituting n 2=  into D  but making no assumptions about N  gives 
(A12) D( 2, ) A BΓ = +  with  
2 2A 1 ( 8 2N ) ( 4N 4 3N )γ γ= + − + + −  and 2 2 2B ( 8 2N ) 2αγ αγ α γ= − + + . 
We observe that A  and B  decrease in N  and for given α  and γ  become negative 
for N  sufficiently large. Moreover, B 0=  if 0α = . Solving D( 2, )Γ  for γ , setting 
0α = , gives 
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(A13) 
2
1 2
4 N 3 3N N
3N 4N 4
γ − + − += − −  and 
2
2 2
4 N 3 3N N
3N 4N 4
γ − + − += − −  
As it can be shown, only the first solution is positive for N 3≥  and hence the relevant 
one, which we denote by ( N )γ  in the text. Since A  is concave in γ  for N 3≥ , we 
can conclude that i ( 2, ) 0Φ Γ ≥  if 0 ( N )γ γ≤ ≤ . It is straightforward to check that 
( N ) 1γ <  and ( N ) / N 0γ∂ ∂ <  for N 3≥ .  
Investigating B  and computing 2B / 2 ( 8 2N 2 )α γ γ α∂ ∂ = + − +  reveals that α  has 
clearly a positive influence on stability for N { 3,4 }∈ . For N 5≥ , α  must be suffi-
ciently large. Noticing that B , and hence A B+ , is concave in α  
( 2 2 2B / 2 0α γ∂ ∂ = > ), we solve D( 2, )Γ  for α  and find 
(A14) 
2 2 2 2
1
1 N 4 2 N 3 N 3γ γ γ γ γα γ
− + − + − +=  and  
    
2 2 2 2
2
1 N 4 2 N 3 N 3γ γ γ γ γα γ
− + − − − +=  
where only the first solution is positive and hence the relevant one. Hence, observing 
(A6), we get 
(A15) 
2 2 2 21 N 4 2 N 3 N 31 ( ,N )
( N 1)
γ γ γ γ γα Ψ γγ γ
− + − + − +≥ ≥ =− . 
Obviously, 1 /(( N 1) )γ−  decreases in N  and γ . For ( ,N )Ψ γ  we find 
(A16) 
2 2
2 2
( 3 3N N 2 N 3( ,N ) 0
N ( 3 3N N
γ γ γΨ γ
γ
− + + −∂ = >∂ − +  and 2
( ,N ) 1 0Ψ γγ γ
∂ = >∂  
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recalling that we assume N 3≥ . Hence, with increasing N , the range of α  that satis-
fies (A15) decreases. Moreover, the possibility of increasing γ  above ( N )γ  to 
( N , )γ α  is also limited. For instance, using (A13) and (A15), we find: 
N 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
( N )γ  0.41 0.19 0.12 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.04 
( N , )γ α  0.60 0.25 0.15 0.11 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.05 
 
Inserting ( n )γ  for γ  in (A15) shows however that 1 ( ,N ) 0
( N 1)
Ψ γγ − >−  for 
N 2≥  and hence there always exists an α  that satisfies condition (A15) at the limit 
of ( n )γ γ= .  
Investigating the closing the gap index as defined in (10) in the text for n 2= , we find 
(A17) 
2
2 2
2( N 1) HCGI
N( 2 N 1) ( 1)( N 1)
αγ γ
αγ γ γ αγ
+ += + + + + −
i  with 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2H 3 2 N 2 N 2 N 4 N 6 2 N N 2 N 2 N 2N 3α γ αγ αγ αγ αγ αγ γ γ γ γ= − + + − + − + − + − + −
 
Differentiating CGI  with respect to α  gives 
(A18) 
2
3 2 2
CGI 2 ( N 2 )( N 1) J
N( 2 N 1) ( 1) ( N 1)
γ αγ γ
α αγ γ γ αγ
∂ − + += −∂ + + + + −
i  with J I K= + , 
2 2 2 3 2I ( 2N N 6 ) 2 ( N N ) ( N N )γ γ= − − − − − +  and  
2 2 2 2 2 2K ( 4N 2N 12 ) ( 2N N 6 ) 2 ( N N )αγ α γ αγ= − − + − − − − . 
We want to show that J 0>  and hence this derivative is negative. First we concen-
trate on I . We notice that I  is concave in γ . Setting I 0=  and solving for γ  gives 
two values of which only one is positive. This value, denoted by ( N )ωγ , is given by 
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(A19) 
2 3N 1 2N 9N 5 2N( N )
N( N 1)ω
γ − + + − − += + . 
Thus, I 0≥  if ( N )ωγ γ≤ . Now it can be shown that ( N ) ( N )ωγ γ>  for N 4≥  and 
hence I 0>  for N 4≥  and 0 ( N )γ γ≤ ≤ , i.e. the parameter range for which a coali-
tion of two players is stable without ancillary benefits. We now turn to K  and find: 
(A20) 2 2 2 2 2K ( 4N 2N 12 ) 2 ( 2N N 6 ) 2 ( N N )γ αγ γα
∂ = − − + − − − −∂  and  
2
2 2
2
K 2 ( 2N N 6 )γα
∂ = − −∂  . 
The second derivative is positive for N 3≥  and hence K  is convex in α . Hence, 
setting the first derivative to zero and solving for α  gives us a minimum. We find: 
(A21) 
2 2
*
2
12( N N ) ( 4N 2N 12 )
2( 2N N 6 )
γα
− − − −
= − − . 
Now the numerator can only be positive if 1 / γ  is sufficiently small. Since we 
consider the range 0 ( N ) 1γ γ≤ ≤ < , we test whether the numerator of *α  is positive 
for ( N )γ . It turns out that this is not the case for N 3≥ . Consequently, K  is 
minimized for 0α = . Then, however, K 0= , and hence J 0>  and therefore 
CGI / 0α∂ ∂ <  for 0 ( N )γ γ≤ ≤ . Consequently, we can conclude that α  can only 
have a positive influence on CGI  if and only if ( N )γ γ>  because then no coalition 
is stable without ancillary benefits. 
